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Abstract. We present a composably secure protocol allowing n parties to test an
entanglement generation resource controlled by a possibly dishonest party. The test
consists only in local quantum operations and authenticated classical communication
once a state is shared among them and provides composable security, namely it can be
used as a secure subroutine by n honest parties within larger communication protocols
to test if a source is sharing quantum states that are at least -close to the GHZ state.
This claim comes on top of previous results on multipartite entanglement verification
where the security was studied in the usual game-based model. Here, we improve the
protocol to make it more suitable for practical use in a quantum network and we study
its security in the Abstract Cryptography framework to highlight composability issues
and avoid hidden assumptions. This framework is a top-to-bottom theory that makes
explicit any piece of information that each component (party or resource) gets at every
time-step of the protocol. Moreover any security proof, which amounts to showing
indistinguishability between an ideal resource having the desired security properties (up
to local simulation) and the concrete resource representing the protocol, is composable
for free in this setting. This allows us to readily compose our basic protocol in order to
create a composably secure multi-round protocol enabling honest parties to obtain a
state close to a GHZ state or an abort signal, even in the presence of a noisy or malicious
source. Our protocol can typically be used as a subroutine in a Quantum Internet, to
securely share a GHZ state among the network before performing a communication or
computation protocol.
Keywords : Composable security, Abstract Cryptography, Simulation-based cryptogra-
phy, Entanglement verification, Quantum Internet.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Recent conceptual developments in the quantum Internet have allowed to start defining
layer models for quantum network architectures [1, 2]. Similar to the OSI model
for the classical Internet, these models separate physical and application issues to
allow researchers to study experimental problems such as extending coherence time or
establishing entangled links between distant nodes using various physical platforms [3, 4]
and conversely to start developing high-level applications that could sit on top of any
physical implementation. A non-exhaustive overview of protocols for the future quantum
Internet can be found on the Quantum Protocol Zoo website [5]. These layer models
shed light on composable security issues that have to be addressed. Roughly speaking,
a protocol is said to be composably secure if it can be used multiple times in a row or as
a subroutine in any bigger protocol without threatening the overall security. A protocol
can thus be seen as a black box that can be composed with other protocols, which is
precisely the way we would like to think of applications in such settings.
Expected progress within the next few years will lead to several realistic applications
such as quantum money [6, 7], voting [8], or anonymous transmission [9] that rely on
firstly securely establishing entanglement between all nodes in a quantum network. More
precisely, many applications can be achieved in such a network of n nodes by first sharing
an entangled state then manipulating it locally to get the desired entanglement needed
for the rest of the protocol. One such multiparty state is the GHZ state |0〉
⊗
n+|1〉
⊗
n
√
2
[10]
where each party holds one qubit. In this context, it becomes relevant to have a secure
protocol for ensuring that the source shares a state that is at least -close to the GHZ
state. In order to be practical, this protocol should have the minimum requirements for
the parties, which are to be able to perform classical communication and local single
qubit operations. It should also be composable as it is meant to be used as a subroutine
in bigger quantum network protocols.
To show composability results, one has to prove security in a composable framework.
Here we use the Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework [11, 12] that captures the ideal-
world vs. real-world paradigm. We continue this introduction by presenting the abstract
cryptography framework and how composable security can be proven. We try to provide
a full introduction to the framework so that it is accessible to non experts in the topic.
Then in the second section we present the ideal abstraction of a verification protocol with
the desired security properties as well as an actual multipartite entanglement verification
protocol that achieves this functionality. This protocol, designed as a subroutine for
bigger protocols in a distributed setting, presents interesting security properties and is
believed to be achievable in the near future. We study its composability properties in
the AC framework. Then in the last section we discuss possible implementations in
near-tear quantum networks and limitations of such constructions.
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1.2. Composability and Abstract Cryptography
In order to prove composable security, one needs to prove security in a composable
framework. One such framework is Abstract (or Constructive) Cryptography (AC),
a top-down approach developed by U. Maurer and R. Renner [11, 13, 12] to define a
simulation-based cryptography theory. It creates some notion of a module with well-
defined interfaces that interacts with the rest of the world in a black box fashion. In
the Universal Composability framework of Canetti [14], this is called a functionality. In
AC, those modules are called resources and going from a resource to another is done
through converters called protocols. For example a one-time pad protocol constructs a
secure communication channel resource out of a secret key resource and an authenticated
classical channel (see Fig. 1). In their first paper [11], Renner and Maurer defined a
complete cryptography algebra of resources with their composition rules. This allowed
them to define equivalence relations between resources and to infer security notions that
inherit composability properties. Moreover this framework is of interest when modeling
multiparty protocols as it offers a simpler view of what dishonest parties could have
access to than the usual game-based cryptography theory where the strategy for a
dishonest group should be given explicitly. The level of abstraction of the different
resources can be modulated to highlight the properties that one wants to study about
them. Finally, the AC framework is a resource theory with a large power of abstraction
that allows us to think of a protocol the same way we would do when thinking of an
application in the quantum Internet.
Different results have been achieved using this framework such as the study of unfair
coin tossing [15], remote state preparation [16], oblivious transfer [17] and composable
security of multiparty delegated quantum computing [18, 19, 20]. Different extensions
have also been proposed such as adding relativistic constraints [21] or global event his-
tory in the case of ratcheting [22]. Let us give a brief overview of this framework which
we will use to study our multipartite entanglement verification protocol.
Abstract cryptography uses the concept of abstract systems to express cryptography
as a resource theory. A cryptography protocol is viewed as the construction of some
ideal resource S out of other real resourcesR. This construction notion is made through
converters. Finally, the distance between two resources is formalised through the notion
of a distinguisher. Those three objects are the building blocks of the AC theory.
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Figure 1. Concrete One Time Pad resource piApiBRpiE : Alice has access to the
left interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the down interface. R is the
resource composed of a secret key resource and an authentic channel resource in
parallel. Protocols are represented in blue, piE being the protocol of an honest Eve
that blocks the input y from the authenticated channel resource.
A resource is an abstract system with interfaces specified by a set I (e.g.
I = {A,B,E} for Alice, Bob and Eve in a tripartite setting). Each interface is accessible
to one user and provides them with some abilities. Note that the notion of a party
is not explicitly modeled in this framework, but induced by the interfaces they are
restricted to have access to. Resources are used to model functionalities that are not
done specifically by a party. They can be associated with real physical resources (e.g.
a quantum channel) or with abstract functionalities (e.g. bit commitment or quantum
random number generation). The level of abstraction of such a functionality is not
bounded per se but it is usually tailored to the application that one is modeling and the
properties one wants to highlight. For example quantum memories can be explicit and
represented with resources or abstracted in converters. Classical protocols can also be
explicitly shown or abstracted through oracle calls. Moreover any parallel composition
of resources is a resource in which the interface set corresponds to the union of the ones
from the composed resources.
Converters are also abstract systems with one set of “inside” interfaces that are
expected to be connected to a resource and one set of “outside” interfaces. Their name
derives from the fact that a converter attached to a resource converts it into another
resource by emulating a certain set of interfaces to the outside world. They typically
model the local computation of a party during a protocol and are denoted with Greek
letters. For a resourceR with interfaces A and B and a two-party protocol pi = {piA, piB}
we denote piARpiB the resource obtained from connecting piA to interface A and piB to
interface B (see Fig. 1). A dishonest party is then modeled by just unplugging their
corresponding converter from the resources, indicating that the party is not following
the protocol. This leaves the interface they have been accessing open to the outside
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world. Note that the ordering of the converters is not important and that they are
usually written in the most readable way.
Converters are also used to model the honest utilisation of an ideal resource. Indeed
a dishonest user might have access to more functionalities than an honest one. To model
this we use a converter, a filter, to cover these functionalities for an honest player, that
we remove in case of a dishonest utilisation of the resource (see an example in Fig. 2).
Finally, converters are used in the ideal world to simulate the local output to a dishonest
party, in which case we use the term of simulator. Converters and resources can be
described with the help of boxes and arrows as well as in the form of algorithms by
specifying where each output goes.
Figure 2. Filtered one-way private classical channel resource. It takes as input a
bitstring x at the left interface, outputs it at the right interface and leaks its size |x| on
the bottom interface. ⊥ is a filter blocking the bottom interface to simulate an honest
use of the resource. As we will see in the next section, this resource is equivalent to
the one of Fig. 1.
Abstract cryptography is thus the theory of breaking down cryptographic processes
into box-shaped resources that can be composed together in series or in parallel.
Resources, which represent cryptographic primitives, can be transformed into other
resources using converters and composition. A concrete resource represents an actual
protocol using physical systems and classical and/or quantum operations while an ideal
resource is the abstraction of the functionality achieved by the protocol. We say that
a protocol pi = {piA, piB} constructs the resource S out of R and write R pi−→ S. Such a
construction is composable if for all R,S and T resources and pi, ν converters (protocols)
such that R pi−→ S and S ν−→ T we have that
R pi−→ S ∧ S ν−→ T =⇒ R ν◦pi−−→ T . (1)
1.3. Security definition and assumptions
To show that a protocol pi constructs the ideal S out of concrete resource R, we have
to capture an equivalence notion, with a metric ≈ such that piR ≈ S def⇐⇒ R pi−→ S.
To that end, Abstract Cryptography introduces Dinstiguishers. They are abstract
systems that are used to construct a pseudo-metric between two resources. They replace
the notion of an adversary and also encompass any protocol that is run before, after
or during the protocol being analyzed. As its name indicates, a distinguisher is used
to distinguish between two resources R and S by connecting to all their interfaces and
outputting a single bit: a guess whether it is interacting with R or S (see Fig. 3). The
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advantage of a distinguisher D is given by
dD(R,S) = |Pr[DR = 0]− Pr[DS = 0]|,
where DR is the output of D when interacting with R. For example in Fig. 3, replacing
R with piApiBRpiE from Fig.1 and S with the filtered private authenticated classical
channel resource from Fig. 2, we see that any distinguisher D will see the same output
x for any given input x on any of the two resources. Hence we have that dD(R,S) = 0.
For a class of distinguishers D, the distinguishing advantage is defined as
dD(R,S) = sup
D∈D
dD(R,S).
Figure 3. A distinguisher interacting with R and S. It has access to a complete
description of the two systems and can choose the inputs of all players, receive their
outputs and simultaneously fulfill the role of an adversary. After interaction, it must
guess which resource is which. Replacing R by Fig. 1 and S by Fig. 2, no distinguisher
is able to guess between the two resources.
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric on the space satisfying all
properties of a composable distance, namely identity, symmetry and triangle inequality.
This allows to define equivalence relations between resources: for a class of distinguishers
D we say that R is equivalent (or -close to) S and write R ≈ S (resp. R ≈ S) if
dD(R,S) = 0 (resp. dD(R,S) ≤ ).
To summarize, converters describe mostly local and non-costly operations while
resources can have non local functionalities and extended computational power. Distin-
guishers are all powerful objects that represent the environment trying to guess between
two resources.
We now have the necessary ingredients to present the notion of secure construction
of a resource in AC. Let pi = {pii}ni=1 be a protocol run by n parties using the concrete
resource R that has interfaces I and let S be an ideal resource with all the desired
properties expected from the protocol. We say that pi securely construct S out of R
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within  and write R (pi,)−−→ S if there exist converters σ = {σi} called simulators such
that
∀P ⊆ I, piPR ≈ σI\PS, (2)
with ∀P ⊆ I, piP = {pii}i∈P .
This means that for each party i that does not follow its protocol pii, we are able to
find a simulator σi that locally simulates on the ideal resource the interfaces the party has
access to on the concrete resource. Simulators don’t represent actual concrete operations
and should only be seen as a tool in the proof. For example, using a simulator σ taking
as input a size and producing a random bit string of this size, we have an equivalence
relation between the concrete one-time pad resource with an dishonest Eve piApiBR
and the ideal private classical channel resource on which we attach σ (see Fig. 4).
This equivalence together with the equivalence of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 (usually denoted
as the correctness of the protocol) proves the composably secure construction of the
private classical channel resource by the one-time pad protocol. In this case, those
two equivalences suffice because we suppose Alice and Bob to be always honest in the
one-time pad protocol. One must find simulators for each subset of possible dishonest
parties to prove composable construction.
Figure 4. Equivalence between the One-time pad resource with a dishonest Eve and
the ideal private classical channel resource with the simulator σ.
The power of the class of distinguishers and simulators used to prove a secure
construction determines the strength of the security proof. For example considering only
classical distinguishers leads to security against classical adversaries while considering all
powerful distinguishers leads to information-theoretic security. Ideally we would want
the class of simulators to be restricted to a class of easily implementable converters and
the set of distinguishers to be as general as possible. This leads to security statements
such as “We can easily construct the ideal resource S from R and we can easily simulate
any cheating behaviour such that even a very powerful distinguisher cannot tell the two
resources apart”.
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2. An entanglement generation testing resource
2.1. Multipartite entanglement verification protocol
In the following we describe a protocol that securely constructs an ideal multipartite
entanglement verification resource using only classical communication between n parties
that each receive a single qubit from a source of multipartite entanglement. We believe
the following proof can be adapted to any stabilizer state verification where parties first
receive a qubit and then do only local operations and classical communication (LOCC).
We first review the original protocol from [23], then introduce the ideal and
concrete resources, and finally prove the secure construction. In this paper we
will call “Source” the party controlling the entanglement source or the device itself
interchangeably. We will consider authenticated classical communication and perfect
quantum communication as any imperfection can be modeled as the source perfectly
sending noisy states.
Our work is based on the work from [23] where the authors develop and analyze
an n-party verification protocol consisting only of classical communication and local
quantum operations once the state is shared. One of the parties, called the Verifier,
has a central role in the protocol: it sends instructions to all parties and broadcasts the
output of the verification. We recall the protocol of [23]:
Protocol 1 Multipartite entanglement verification protocol
(i) The source creates an n-qubit GHZ state and sends each qubit i to party i using a
state generation resource and n one-way quantum channels.
(ii) The Verifier selects for each i ∈ [n] a random input xi ∈ {0, 1} such that
∑n
i=1 xi ≡ 0
(mod 2) and sends it to the corresponding party via an authenticated classical
channel resource. The Verifier keeps one to themselves.
(iii) If xi = 0, party i performs a Hadamard operation on their qubit. If xi = 1, party i
performs a
√
X operation.
(iv) Each party i measures their qubit in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and sends their outcome
yi to the Verifier via the classical channel.
(v) The Verifier accepts and outputs bout = 0 if and only if
n∑
i=1
yi ≡ 1
2
n∑
i=1
xi(mod 2)
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This protocol has been extensively studied and presents desirable properties that
are expected from such a protocol: it is correct and for one round, its output depends on
the distance between the state that was actually shared by the source and the GHZ state
and the number of malicious parties. Indeed, for a state ρ shared among the parties,
bout is such that:
bout =
{
0 with probability 1− τ2
2
1 with probability τ
2
2
(3)
with
τ = min
U
TD(|GHZ〉〈GHZ| , UρU †) (4)
where TD is the trace distance and U is an operator acting only on the space of the
dishonest parties.
This protocol is made to be repeated several rounds until some confidence is built on
the fact that the source shares GHZ states. In order to prevent the source from sending
a wrong state on the round where it is supposed to be used for computation, the authors
of [23] considered randomizing this round. They also randomize which party should play
the role of the Verifier at each verification round to prevent malicious actions from the
parties. Thus, all parties have access to a trusted common random source that gives,
at each round, a random bit C ∈ {0, 1} used as a security parameter and an identifier
for one party i ∈ [n]. If C = 0 (which happens with some probability PC), the state is
used for computation. If C = 1 (which happens with probability 1 − PC), the parties
perform the above verification protocol with i as the Verifier and restart only if the state
is accepted. It has been proven that the probability that the protocol has not aborted
and that a state ρ such that TD(|GHZ〉〈GHZ| , UρU †) ≥  where U is an operator on
the space of the k dishonest parties is used for computation is less than PC =
4n
k2
.
The security properties in [23] are proven in a game-based framework hence are
not composable. There is for example a strategy where, when performing the protocol
multiple times in a row, a malicious coalition of parties and source could increase the
probability that the honest parties accept a state that is not a GHZ state. It has indeed
been noticed that if we allow for a 50% loss rate in the quantum communication, there
exists a strategy for dishonest players that increases their probability of making the
others accept a faulty state. This problem has been later solved in [24] where a loss-
tolerant variation of this protocol that presents the same security properties, called the
θ-protocol, was implemented in a photonic setting. It mainly consists in changing the
classical instructions X = {xi}ni=1 sent by the Verifier to angles Θ = {θi}ni=1 indicating
the rotated measurement basis for each party. This protocol increases the loss that can
be tolerated by the protocol, but still the dishonest parties can increase their cheating
probability if the losses are high enough. For simplicity we will consider only the version
of the protocol presented above (called the XY-protocol) but the following proof can be
straightforwardly extended to match the θ-protocol as well.
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Composability issues are due to somewhat hidden assumptions in the original game-
based model, such as the lossless channel assumption. Moreover, it is assumed that the
dishonest parties are not disturbing the classical communication between the players or
the random choosing of the Verifier and that they don’t have access to the quantum
memories of the honest parties. This may threaten the security of the protocol when
used as a subroutine of a bigger one. Finally, the game-based framework assumes a
specific strategy from the dishonest parties: they are actively trying to convince the
honest parties that they all share a GHZ state when they don’t. This of course makes
sense when we look at the protocol in a stand-alone setting, but may not be the case
when the protocol is part of a bigger, more complicated one. Using the AC framework,
we can deal with all possible dishonest strategies with the help of distinguishers. It forces
us to explicit every input and output of each party and to avoid hidden assumptions on
dishonest behaviour and on physical resources. Additionally, it gives a box-like form for
the protocol that corresponds to the way we think about applications in the quantum
Internet.
2.2. Ideal Resource
Let us now present the ideal resource for practical multipartite entanglement verification.
Consider a source using physical resources to create and share an n-qubit quantum state
to n parties expecting a qubit from a GHZ state. Our resource, called MEVC , aims
to get a sense of how trustworthy the source is, by verifying that it sends a state at
least close to the GHZ state. It also has a built-in parameter C that makes the resource
output qubits with some probability known by all n+ 1 parties using the resource.
This black box (see Fig. 5 for a 3-party example) has n+ 1 input interfaces. All n
parties wishing to test a source collectively send a start signal to the input interfaces of
resource. The last interface is the source interface that gets a classical description of the
state sent by the source. Upon reception of the start inputs, MEVC will forward the
start signals to the source interface then wait for the classical description of an n-qubit
quantum state ρ. After that, it outputs on all interfaces a bit C = 0 with probability
p, or C = 1 with probability 1− p. This bit indicates if the resource is going to output
qubits or a verification bit bout. The probability distribution of C can be tuned freely
to match any distribution. If C = 0 it then outputs to each party a qubit of ρ and if
C = 1 it computes a bit bout indicating if the state shared by the source is close to the
GHZ state and sends it to all parties. This box is made to be composed with itself in
series with a very small p until all parties get a qubit or bout = 1.
Composable Security for Multipartite Entanglement Verification 11
Figure 5. The MEVC resource for n = 3 parties. For readability we put the parties
interfaces on the left and the source interface on the right. The left interfaces are
“collective interfaces” meaning that inputs are sent collectively by all the parties and
the output is obtained by all parties.
The output bit bout should indicate whether the state shared by the source is -close
to the GHZ state for some . At this level of abstraction, we don’t care whether this
behaviour comes from a faulty device or an actual adversary trying to manipulate the
source. Our MEVC resource outputs a bout such that
bout =
{
0 with probability 1− τ2
2
1 with probability τ
2
2
(5)
with
τ = TD(|GHZ〉〈GHZ| , ρ), (6)
where TD is the trace distance. The output of the resource is thus probabilistic, and
depends on the trace distance between the input state ρ and the GHZ state and on the
security parameter C. Notice that this bout follows the same distribution as the one of
the original protocol (see Sec. 2.1) in the case where all parties are honest. The security
parameter C is added to the verification procedure to make the resource suitable for
practical use in larger protocols where one wants to eventually get shared entanglement
between the parties when the source is acting correctly.
Now in the case of the honest use of the resource, the source interface is given as
input a classical description of the GHZ state. Moreover the output C remains hidden to
the outside world. In AC this is modeled by using converters, the so called filters, that
block the adversarial interfaces (thus filtering the outputs) and send a specific input. In
our case we define one filter ⊥ that enforces the honest use of MEVC . It blocks any
deviation from the outside world and upon reception of a start signal, it sends a classical
description of a GHZ state to MEVC (see Fig. 6). It has its inside interface plugged
into theMEVC resource and its outside interface open to inputs from any distinguisher
(see [22] for extended discussion about filtering and the inclusion of events in AC).
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Figure 6. Filter ⊥. Upon reception of a start input, it outputs a classical description
of a GHZ state on its inside interface and blocks any input at its outside or inside
interface.
Composed with MEVC , they form our ideal resource MEVC⊥ for secure verified
GHZ sharing or source testing (see Fig. 7 for a 3-party example).
Figure 7. The ideal filtered MEVC⊥ resource for n = 3 parties. On the left are the
“collective interfaces” that are used by the parties to collectively send the start signal
and receive the output. On the right is the source interface filtered by ⊥, that blocks
any input and sends a specific message to the resource.
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2.3. Concrete Resource
We will now make explicit the protocol in the AC framework, by defining the resources
used and the converters for each party. We first define the concrete resources, which in
this case are abstractions of physical resources. Namely we define the state generator
resource, the one-way quantum channel resource, the two-way classical channel resource
and two multiparty classical computation oracles.
The state generator resource (see Fig. 8) represents a perfect source of quantum
states able to create arbitrary quantum states of at most n qubits. Receiving a classical
description of an n-qubit state ρ on its input interface it will output each qubit of ρ
on its n output interfaces. This resource can be used to model imperfect sources by
including the noise in the classical description of the state given as input. We consider
that no information is leaked by this resource about the state that it creates, as it is the
more restricting scenario in our security proof. In Sec. 3.3 we discuss the realization of
such a resource.
SGn
Class. 
desc.
of  ⍴
.
.
.{n qubits of ⍴
Figure 8. State generator resource.
The SGn resource is to be composed with n quantum channel resources which we
draw as arrows with a Q (see Fig. 9). A quantum channel resource in our case is a perfect
private authenticated quantum channel which takes as input a qubit and outputs the
same qubit at a different place without any leakage.
Figure 9. Quantum channel resource.
Finally the classical communication between parties is modeled through classical
channel resources which we simply draw as arrows (see Fig. 10). They take bits at any
of their interfaces and transmit them to the other interface. We suppose those channels
to be authenticated: to any other party watching the channel, it will also output of the
message transmitted without the possibility to alter it. In order not to overload the
figures, we don’t represent this leaking interface when all parties are honest but we do
when considering a dishonest source watching over the classical communication.
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Figure 10. Classical channel resource.
We will abstract multiparty classical functionalities achieved by the parties by the
use of oracle queries. All parties can collectively call two oracles OC and Ov that
respectively give a common random bit C and a common random party identifier v to
each party. We will draw them as boxes with n input interfaces expecting a collective
query from the parties and n output interface broadcasting C or v. This is a modeling
of classical communication protocols that provide random bits and random identifiers
to the parties. It is not considered private and the values of C and v are available to
any malicious party watching over the classical communication. We will discuss how
these oracles can be replaced by actual classical protocols in Sec. 3.3. Moreover, each
party is locally equipped with a quantum register able to perfectly store a qubit for
the time required by the protocol on which they can perform one-qubit operations and
measurements. Quantum registers will not be drawn in the figures for simplification
purposes as well as the leakage interfaces of the classical channels, but they should not
be forgotten as assumptions in our model, particularly when considering the case of a
malicious party. Since we consider here all parties to be honest during the verification
protocol, we only draw resources and interfaces of interest.
We call R the resource constructed by a state generator resource composed in se-
ries to a collection of n quantum channel resources and in parallel to n classical channel
resources, OC and Ov. R formally defines the creation of a state, common classical ran-
domness generator protocols, the (2-way) classical communication between the Verifier
and the parties and the (one-way) quantum communication between the source and the
parties.
The next step is to present the converters pi = {pii}ni=1 and piS that represent the
protocols followed by each party and the source. They model the local computation
of each party during an honest round of the protocol and can be represented either as
algorithms or as boxes and arrows, that both expect some input from which they produce
output to send to the resources. Their quantum abilities are equal to the ones that we
give to local parties performing the multipartite entanglement verification protocol [23].
We start with pi = {pii}ni=1 representing the protocol followed by each party i. i is
a binary identifier for each party, but for simplicity we represent it with i ∈ [n] and we
write pi[n] for the parallel composition of all {pii}ni=1.
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Protocol 2 Protocol for the ith party pii
(i) Ask the source to send a GHZ state. Wait for the reception of the qubit.
(ii) After reception, query OC , get C and output it. If C = 0, keep the qubit (output
the qubit to party).
(iii) If C = 1,
(a) Query Ov, get v.
(b) If v 6= i
1. Wait for the reception of xi.
2. If xi = 0, perform a Hadamard operation on the qubit. If xi = 1, perform
a
√
X operation on the qubit.
3. Measure in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis.
4. Send the outcome yi to the Verifier via the classical channel resource.
(c) If v = i
1. Create a random bit string X = {xi}ni=1 with xi ∈ {0, 1} such that∑n
i=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2)
2. Send xi it to party i via a classical channel resource, keep xv.
3. Follow steps (iii).b.2 to (iii).b.4 and get yv
4. Wait for the reception of all the other yi.
5. Upon the reception of all the yi, output 0 to all if
n∑
i=1
yi ≡ 1
2
n∑
i=1
xi(mod 2)
and 1 otherwise.
The actual verification protocol is thus seen here as a subroutine (steps (iii).(a) to
(iii).(c)). All parties start by collectively querying a qubit and C and then, depending
on the value of C, they either keep the qubit or do the verification protocol. During
the verification protocol, one party is chosen to be the Verifier and after some classical
communication and local quantum operations, the Verifier sends the output bout to all
parties.
The last converter, piS, represents the local operation that an honest source would
perform using the source to create an n-qubit GHZ state and send it to the parties.
That is simply sending, upon receiving a signal from the parties, a classical description
of the GHZ state to the SGn resource. It implies that the source is not watching the
classical communication between the parties at any point. Functioning like a filter, this
converter is made to be removed in case the source is noisy or some malicious party
takes control of the source to reveal new interfaces to the outside world.
Composable Security for Multipartite Entanglement Verification 16
Protocol 3 Protocol for the source piS
(i) Upon reception of a query by the parties, send a classical description of the GHZ
state to the SGn resource.
Together with R, this completes the definition of the concrete multipartite
entanglement resource pi[n]RpiS (see Fig. 11 for a 3-party example), which takes as input
a start signal and outputs a bit C then a qubit from a GHZ state to each party or a bit
bout = 0.
Figure 11. The pi[n]RpiS Resource within the dotted red line for n = 3 parties wishing
to test a source, when party 1 is chosen to be the Verifier. We represent resources in
red and converters in blue. We recall the timeline of the protocol: (1) all the pii send a
start signal to piS that sends a classical description of a GHZ state to the SGn resource.
(2) Upon reception of the qubit, they send a query to OC and get C. (3) If C = 0
they output a GHZ qubit and if C = 1 the parties query Ov and get v (here party
1). (4) The Verifier sends instructions X = {xi}ni=1 (here {x2, x3}) to others parties,
get outcomes Y = {yi}ni=1 (here {y2, y3}) and computes and broadcasts bout. To avoid
overloading the figure we don’t represent quantum memories as well as the classical
signals going from pi1 to piS . As piS represents honest behaviour from the source, we
also don’t represent the leakage of information from the classical channels.
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2.4. Security Analysis
We come now to the proof of the main claim of this paper, namely that the multipartite
entanglement verification protocol pi securely constructs the MEVC⊥ resource out of
R. We proceed as expected from the security definition of Sec. 1.3 that is by finding
simulators to emulate local dishonest behaviour on the ideal resource. A dishonest
behavior from a party is simply modeled by removing the associated converter and
making new free interfaces accessible to a distinguisher. Simulators should render the
ideal resource indistinguishable from dishonest concrete resources.
We will only consider cases that are of interest for our security claim which are when
all parties are honest and when the source is noisy or malicious. The case of dishonest
parties possibly tampering the source is discussed in Sec. 3.2, but it appears that
composable security cannot be proven in the AC framework when a party is dishonest.
Distinguishers in this section are all powerful, both classicaly and quantumly.
2.4.1. Correctness. The first step of the proof corresponds to the correctness of the
multipartite entanglement verification protocol, meaning that when all parties are honest
and the source is honest the parties all get either a qubit from a GHZ state or a bit
bout = 0.
Theorem 1. The multipartite entanglement verification protocol emulates the filtered
ideal resource MEVC⊥.
Proof. Let D be an all powerful distinguisher trying to guess between MEVC⊥ and
pi[n]RpiS. Let us look at the distribution of outputs that it will get from them.
D first sends start signals to both resources. When interacting with MEVC⊥, it
gets C = 1 and bout = 0 with some probability 1 − p and C = 0 and n qubits from
a GHZ state with probability p by definition of our resource. Throughout this paper,
the probability distribution of p is tuned to match the one of OC . When interacting
with pi[n]RpiS, the distinguisher thus performs the concrete multipartite entanglement
verification protocol with the same probability p. If all parties share a GHZ, the
condition
∑n
i=1 yi ≡ 12
∑n
i=1 xi(mod 2) is always fulfilled (see [23] for complete proof) so
the Verifier always sends bout = 0 at the end. Hence, D gets C = 1 and bout = 0 with
probability 1− p and C = 0 and n qubits from a GHZ state with probability p.
We can conclude that for any distinguisher D, dD(pi[n]RpiS,MEVC⊥) = 0 hence
pi[n]RpiS ≈MEVC⊥. (7)
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2.4.2. Dishonest source. Let us now look at the case of a dishonest or noisy source.
As custom in AC, we model this by removing the filter ⊥ of the ideal resource and
the protocol piS of the concrete one (see Fig. 12). This leaves a new interface free for
a distinguisher to send in a classical description of a state ρ. Because we do not use
private but rather authenticated classical communication, the distinguisher also receives
all leakage of classical communication between the parties and when they query oracles.
C
π1
π2
π3
SGn
Start
bout /
1 qubit from ⍴ 
Start
bout / 
1 qubit from ⍴ 
Start
bout /
1 qubit from ⍴
Q
Q
Q
1 qubit
1 qubit
1 qubit
x3
x2
Start
Start
Ov
OC
Query
Query
Query
v
v
v
Query
Query
Query
C
C
y3
y2
C, v, x3, y3
C, v, x2, y2
Class. Desc. of ⍴
Figure 12. The pi[n]R resource for n = 3 parties when party 1 is chosen as the Verifier,
accessed by a distinguisher (in green). To not overload the figure we join all leakages
interfaces from the classical channel resources into two arrows, but they should each
be considered as a different interface the distinguisher has access to.
In order to prove security, as expected from the security definition of Sec. 1.3, we
need to find a simulator σS such that we can prove pi[n]R ≈ MEVCσS. It should em-
ulate dishonest behaviour and the new interfaces a distinguisher has access to when
interacting with the ideal resource.
Let σS be the simulator shown in Fig. 13. It first takes as input a start signal
from the MEVC resource, then emulates the verification protocol by forwarding this
start signal. After receiving a classical description of a state ρ, it forwards it toMEVC
and gets and forwards the bit C. If C = 1, it creates a random v ∈ [n] and a random
bit string X = {xi}ni=1 such that
∑n
i=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2) and sends them to the outside
world, except for xv. Then it computes a table of possible measurement outcomes by
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calculating all necessary scalar products:
Pr[y1 = 0, y2 = 0, ..., yn = 0] = 〈00...0|UρU † |00...0〉
Pr[y1 = 0, y2 = 0, ..., yn = 1] = 〈00...1|UρU † |00...1〉
...
P r[y1 = 1, y2 = 1, ..., yn = 1] = 〈11...1|UρU † |11...1〉
(8)
with U = Hx1(
√
X)1−x1 ⊗ Hx2(√X)1−x2 ⊗ ... ⊗ Hxn(√X)1−xn corresponding to the
local operations made by each party on their qubit in the verification protocol. Then
it randomly samples Y = {yi}ni=1 from this table and sends them to the outside world,
except for yv.
Figure 13. Simulator σS for a dishonest source.
Roughly speaking, σS classically emulates the whole multiparty protocol by reproducing
the classical communication and local quantum operations. Plugged in MEVC , this
defines a new resource MEVCσS (see Fig. 14). With this simulator we can state that:
Theorem 2. The multipartite entanglement verification protocol with a noisy or
malicious source emulates the ideal resource MEVCσS.
Proof. In this scenario, we have to prove an equivalence betweenMEVCσS and pi[n]R by
showing that no distinguisher sending inputs and receiving outputs from both can guess
which resource it is interacting with. In the concrete setting this means that the parties
will share a state ρ that is τ -close to the GHZ state, with τ = TD(|GHZ〉〈GHZ| , ρ),
that they will either keep or verify with probability S. In [23], it is shown that a state
ρ passes the verification test with probability 1− τ2
2
.
Composable Security for Multipartite Entanglement Verification 20
MEV
                   C 𝝈S
Class. Desc. 
of ⍴
Class. Desc. 
of ⍴
C
Start
C,v
x2, x3
y2, y3
Start 
bout
or
⍴
{
{
Figure 14. The MEVCσS resource for n = 3 parties accessed by a distinguisher (in
green).
Let D be an all powerful distinguisher trying to guess between pi[n]R andMEVCσS.
In the concrete setting, it sends in start signals at the parties interfaces then receives it
at the source interface and sends a classical description of a state ρ to SGn. D then sees
all the classical communication happening out of the authenticated classical channels.
More explicitly it will first see a bit C and if C = 0, nothing but the qubits of ρ at each
parties interface. If C = 1, a random identifier v ∈ [n] leaks, then random bits X\{xv}
from the Verifier to each party, then the outcome of each party’s measurement except
the Verifier’s Y \{yv} and finally the bit bout broadcasted by the Verifier.
In the ideal scenario, after D sends in a start signal,MEVC forwards it to σS which
then sends a start signal simulating the query of a state by the parties. After that, the
distinguisher sends a classical description of a state ρ to σS who forwards it toMEVC ,
which outputs C at all its interfaces. σS gets C and outputs it at its outside interface.
If C = 0, MEVC outputs the qubits of ρ at each party’s interface. If C = 1, σS creates
and outputs a random vˆ ∈ [n] then computes a random bit string Xˆ = {xˆi}ni=1 such that∑n
i=1 xˆi ≡ 0 (mod 2) and sends them to the outside world, except for xˆv. After that, σS
computes the table of Eq. (8), randomly samples Yˆ = {yˆi}ni=1 and outputs them all to
the outside world except for yˆv. FinallyMEVC outputs bˆout = 0 with probability 1− τ22
and bˆout = 1 otherwise.
The probability distribution of the bit C is designed to match the probability
distribution given by the oracle OC . In the concrete setting v is chosen randomly
among the players through a query to the oracle Ov so we have that for all i ∈ [n],
Pr[v = i] = Pr[vˆ = i]. X = {xi}ni=1 and Xˆ = {xˆi}ni=1 are both chosen randomly so
their probability distribution is the same. Y = {yi}ni=1,i 6=v are the outcomes of the
measurements of each qubit ρ by each party in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis after doing the
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operation indicated by each xi. The state after each party applied their operation is
UρU † with U = Hx1(
√
X)1−x1 ⊗Hx2(√X)1−x2 ⊗ ...⊗Hxn(√X)1−xn . They are samples
from the table of Eq. (8). Hence for each i ∈ [n] we have that Pr[yi = 0] = Pr[yˆi = 0].
Finally, by definition of our MEVC resource, the probability distribution of bˆout is the
same as the one of bout.
The probability distribution of the output given by the two resources depending
on the inputs is thus the same. Hence we have that for any distinguisher D,
dD(pi[n]R,MEVσS) = 0 and
pi[n]R ≈MEVCσS. (9)
2.4.3. Conclusion. We have proved that pi[n]RpiS ≈ MEVC⊥ and that ∃σS s.t.
pi[n]R ≈MEVCσS. This means that the multipartite entanglement verification protocol
presented is composable when all parties are honest but with a possibly dishonest source.
The protocol can thus be thought of as a black box and equivalently replaced by the
MEVC resource (Fig. 5) when designing protocols using this one as a subroutine. It
assumes that the parties have access to resources R, including common oracles and
quantum memories.
2.4.4. Application : Multi-round resource. The composability result we proved allows
n parties to securely compose the protocol with itself multiple times. If the probability
that C = 0 is sufficiently small, the protocol will be repeated on expectation enough
times to allow the parties to build high confidence on the source’s ability to create a
state close to the GHZ state. Since the round where they will actually use the qubits
sent by the source to perform some communication or computation protocol is unknown
to the source, it is not possible for the source to adapt and decide when to send faulty
states. Hence it enforces the source to send states that are sufficiently close to the
GHZ state every time it is queried. We call this protocol the multi-round multipartite
entanglement verification protocol.
By defining converters {Πi}ni=1 representing the aforementioned protocol, we can
construct a resource Π[n]MEVC⊥ that gives either a state at least -close to the GHZ
state to n parties or an abort signal (see Fig. 15 for a 3-party example and the explicit
description of a Πi). As it is a composable framework, AC allows us to state that
Π[n]pi[n]RpiS ≈ Π[n]MEVC⊥ (10)
and ∃σS s.t. Π[n]pi[n]R ≈ Π[n]MEVCσS. (11)
This means that the multi-round multipartite entanglement verification protocol
is composably secure in the all honest parties setting but in the presence of a possibly
malicious or noisy source.
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Figure 15. Multi-round verification resource Π[n]MEVC⊥ for 3 parties (in the red
dotted square). It takes start signals as input and outputs either a shared quantum
state -close to the GHZ state or an abort signal.
3. Discussion
3.1. Case of honest parties
The multipartite entanglement verification protocol is particularly suited in a distributed
computing scenario where the parties are honest but where there could be a faulty
resource. They can use this protocol to check if the noise of an entanglement source is
small enough for practical use. Indeed, if after many rounds of performing this protocol
the output is most of the time bout = 0, they can realistically be sure that the source
is producing states that are close to the GHZ state. Its composability allows for the
construction of the multi-round verification resource, which can find practical use in
larger communication protocols, as for example in anonymous ranking [25], quantum
secret sharing [26] or distributed consensus [27] protocols. In fact, any protocol that
starts with a GHZ state shared among n honest parties that don’t trust their source
can be composed with this one in a secure way. This might seem limiting but is in
fact realistic in many distributed computing settings. This protocol can also be seen
as a building block of a quantum network. We can reasonably assume that parties are
honest when performing protocols establishing the network in the same way we think
about parties when considering entanglement distillation, network or transport layer
protocols of the OSI model of the classical Internet. An intermediate scale quantum
Internet example is a network where a source shares a GHZ state to all parties at each
time-step, that they either use or verify. Our verification protocol can in this case be
hidden in the assumptions of the network.
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One may wonder why we did not start by defining the multi-round resource as
presented above from the beginning. This is indeed the practical resource that one would
like to use in larger protocols as it directly provides quantum states that are -close to
the GHZ state. This was based on the fact that our priority was not to define ad hoc the
most useful resource, but to succeed in modeling a resource that is as close as possible
to the signals that will actually be sent by the parties when performing the protocol
in real life, and use this resource in a composably secure way to obtain a practical
multipartite entanglement verification resource, that of the multi-round resource. Our
one-round resource captures the important parameters for composing the protocol in
larger routines and it allows for modularity and a more precise understanding of what
happens in the multi-round case. We will also see below that dishonest behavior of a
party already causes composability issues in the one-round case thus we get a better
understanding of the issues by proving composability in this case. Moreover the box-
shaped resource that we construct using AC (Fig. 7) is close to the black-box picture
that we would like to have when thinking of the building blocks of the Quantum Internet.
Finally, we emphasize that this protocol only assumes classical communications between
the parties and single-qubit local operations for each party, making it a good candidate
for scalable application development.
3.2. Case of a malicious party
When studying this problem, it is natural to think about the case of dishonest parties
possibly controlling the source. If we assume that dishonest parties are trying to make
the others accept a state that is not close the GHZ state, results from [23] and [24] show
that for one round of verification, the output bit bout depends on the minimal distance
between the GHZ state and the shared state up to local operations on the part of the
state held by the dishonest parties. This result holds even when the dishonest parties
have complete control over the state generation resource. For this to hold, we have
to assume that the Verifier is always honest and that the parties cannot influence the
probability distributions of the oracles OC and Ov.
Yet as discussed in the first part of this paper, it seems that this protocol cannot
be proven composable in the Abstract Cryptography framework when considering a
dishonest party. Indeed one straightforward strategy for a dishonest party would be to
make the protocol abort randomly, which would give false information about the source.
Any dishonest party actually has complete control on the distribution of the concrete
resource’s output bout while the ideal resource’s output is fixed by the distance with the
GHZ state of the state given as input. Even if we add switches to our resource on which
a simulator could act to make it abort (as custom is such cases), we could not reproduce
the abort probability distribution of our concrete protocol in the ideal world. It seems
impossible to find a simulator that emulates the interfaces a distinguisher has access to
when removing one of the pii. This can be seen in the AC framework by removing the
converters corresponding to the dishonest parties and finding distinguishing attacks for
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every possible simulator. We would moreover need extra assumptions on the quantum
registers and the access to the multiparty computation oracles OC and Ov that seem
unpractical in a near-term network.
However, our composability result comes on top of the security proof of [23]
meaning that our multiparty entanglement verification protocol is secure against possible
coalition of dishonest parties and source trying to persuade others that they share a GHZ
when they don’t and composably secure against a malicious source. It does not limit
the use of our protocol to the all honest case. No attack is known to make use of the
repetition of the protocol that would alter the integrity of the shared state more than
simply repeating the attack described in [23]. On the other hand, the availability of
the resource can be compromised by dishonest behaviour in an unpredictable way. This
sheds light on the pros and cons of using a game-based framework versus a composable
framework. In the former we can restrict dishonest behaviour to specific attacks and
get specific security properties while in the former we can only act on how powerful the
class of distinguishers is but get more general security claims. By studying the protocol
in different frameworks, we are able to take the best of all approaches and show different
aspects of security that increase confidence in the protocols.
3.3. Practical implementation in a near-term quantum network
To actually implement the protocol, one has to replace the resources in R with actual
protocols or physical resources. Multiparty classical protocols should take the place of
oracle calls, and have to be proved composable to securely construct R out of them and
the quantum resources. An example of a protocol replacing calls to OC is the random
bit protocol explicited in [9] and [28]. Previous work [23] shows that by choosing the
probability of using the qubit for computation (C = 0) to be 
2
4nδ
for some δ > 0, all
honest parties have the guarantee that the probability the state used has distance at
least  from the correct one is at most 1
δ
.
Qubit transportation should be taken care of by physical channels and link layer
protocols that one has to study to see if they are equivalent to the quantum channel
resource presented in this paper. As previously mentioned, any noisy channel can be
modeled by a perfect channel in which a noisy state is given as input, and a noisy
source can be modeled by a perfect source in which a classical description of a noisy
state is given. The SGn resource is designed as an attempt to capture what happens
in the most general case when the protocol is performed in the lab where, at some
point, a classical signal is sent to a quantum device that creates a state. Usually some
information is accessible to the person controlling the device to check (for example by
heralding photons) if the right state has been created. We suppose here that none of
this information leaks from SGn as it is the more restricting scenario. Moreover we don’t
restrict the source to create only n-qubit states, but merely enforce that it is able to
create states up to this size. The proof holds even if the source creates bigger states and
keeps part of it or sends it to a malicious party. SGn is thus not meant to be realistic
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but to give an abstract embodiment of any source. A photonic implementation of a loss-
tolerant variation of the original protocol has been achieved with 4 parties [24]. This
leads to expect near-term realization of our protocol, presenting all security properties
as well as composability and modularity for use in bigger protocols.
Lastly, the quantum memory assumption can be removed by asking the parties to
measure their bit directly after receiving it and flipping the outcome randomly depending
on the input given by the Verifier. We would lose the security properties against a
malicious party from [23] that are based on the actual order of the inputs for each
party. In our all honest setting, this would not matter so this protocol can actually be
used in near-term architecture to securely check a source. Experimental realization of
this protocol in a composable way is currently studied, which would allow to take this
protocol as a concrete building block for applications in the quantum Internet. Whether
this protocol should remain in the application layer or be hidden in some network or
transport layer is still to be determined and will depend on future developments in
quantum network architectures.
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